What  is  Behind 
the  Waje  Contract 
&Mnois  Miners 


CONTENTS 

Vital  Public  Considerations 

Cost  to  Public  of  Union   Irresponsi- 
bility 

Debilitated  Authority  of  Management 

Denied    Use  of   Mechanical    Labor 
Saving  Devices 

Clean  Coal    -\  Standardized  Product 

Loss  to  tlie  Public  from  Excess  of 

Screenings 

Strikes  and   Other  Operating  Em- 

A&senteelsm-An  Expensive  Luxury 
JFThe  Check-off- 
Method  of  Handling  Wage  Dispute 


This 

Book 

Answers  This 
Question 


Issued  by 

Illinois  Coal  Operators 
Association 


Some  Vitally  Essential 
Considerations 

TWENTY-FIVE  years  ago,  the  coal  operators 
of  Illinois,  impelled  by  the  necessity  of  secur- 
ing peace  with  mine  labor,  and  stimulated  by 
the  hope  of  securing  guarantees  for  the  greater 
continuity  of  mine  operation,  adopted  the  system  of 
negotiating  wage  contracts  by  collective  bargaining. 

It  must  now  be  admitted  that  the  methods  then 
adopted,  and  since  followed,  have  not  achieved 
success. 

Failure  is  mainly  due  to  the  contractual  incom- 
petency  of  the  miners'  organization. 

The  essential  feature  of  every  contract  is  that  for 
a  stated  consideration  a  certain  performance  is 
assured  or  guaranteed. 

The  exact  value  of  a  contract  is  measured  by  the 
capability  and  responsibility  of  the  contracting 
parties. 

Where  either  party  is  neither  legally  liable  or  re- 
sponsible, the  sole  guarantee  of  performance  is  honor 
and  moral  integrity. 

The  lack  of  direct,  legal  responsibility  of  mine- 
workers  as  a  party  to  the  wage  agreement  has  all 
along  been  declared  by  them  to  be  fully  offset  by 
their  repeated  avowal  of  absolute  integrity  of  pur- 
pose and  their  determination  to  make  such  an  ar- 
rangement a  continuing  panacea  against  mine  labor 
difficulties. 

That  simple  assurance  by  labor's  representatives, 
however  sincerely  by  them  given  or  believed,  is 
totally  inadequate,  is  now  clearly  established. 

The  remedy  for  this  situation  is  now  beyond  the 
unaided  power  of  the  coal  operators,  and  legislative 
action  must  therefore  be  had  to  secure  correction. 

(1)  Labor   must,   by   legal   enactment,   be   made 
fully  and  equally  responsible  with  all  other  classes. 

(2)  Irresponsible  and  unregulated    monopoly    of 
labor   in   any   industry,   must   be   made   impossible, 
the  same  as  any  other  form  of  artificial  monopoly. 

Sound  public  policy  dictates  that  where  there  is 
monopoly  there  should  be  regulation.  Either  the 
present  indulgent  but  monopolistic  mine  labor  laws 
of  Illinois  should  be  repealed  or  Illinois  mine  labor 
required  to  accept  strict  regulation  that  would  make 
it  assume  legally  the  simple  principle  of  full  con- 
tractual responsibility. 

Organized  labor  would  make  no  sacrifice  thereby, 
but  would  benefit  from  the  results  of  such  legisla- 
tion. The  intrusion  of  radicalism  in  all  organized 
groups  of  laborers,  is  repeatedly  claimed  by  labor 
leaders  as  a  condition  justifying  their  excuses  for 
their  failure  to  "deliver  the  goods." 

Therefore,  the  legal  remedies  herein  urged,  should 
be  as  welcome  to  conscientious  labor  leaders  and 
members  of  labor  organizations  as  strengthening 
them  in  establishing  and  maintaining  discipline  and 
contract  observance,  and  the  results  should  be  as 
welcome  to  them  as  it  would  be  to  the  employer 
and  to  the  public  in  the  correction  of  wasteful  and 
uneconomic  practices. 

Any  adverse  effect  would  be  borne  rather  by  the 
unscrupulous  and  arbitrary  labor  leader,  or  radical 
element  who  have  as  often  sacrificed  the  interest 
of  their  fellow  members  as  they  violated  property 
rights  and  public  welfare. 


Cost  to   the    Public  of    the 
United  Mine  Workers  Irre- 
sponsibility Under  the  Wage 
Contract  at  Illinois  Mines 

THAT  those  who  are  interested  may  have  op- 
portunity to  study  and  thoughtfully  consider 
just  how  and  through  what  failures,  under  past 
wage  contracts  between  Illinois  coal  operators  and 
miners,  abuses  have  grown  up  that  are  now  distinctly 
inequitable  and  burdensome  to  the  operators,  and  the 
direct  occasion  for  unnecessary  cost  of  coal  to  the 
public, — there  is  given  herein  a  few  excerpts  from 
the  last  wage  contract  which  expired  March  31st, 
1922.  A  brief  presentation  has  also  been  made  of 
the  experience  that  has  been  developed  in  the  con- 
tinuation of  work  under  this  form  of  wage  con- 
tract. 

j  The  recently  uncontrolled,  and  according  to  the 
officials  of  the  mine  workers'  organization,  the<  un- 
controllable violation  and  neglect  of  each  or  either 
'of  these  provisions  has,  in  every  instance,  meant 
'positive  increase  in  the  cost  of  coal  and  a  conse- 
'quent  increase  in  price  to  the  public. 

Many  of  these  contract  clauses  have  come  to  be 
only  empty  words  and  idle  promises,  and  where 
there  is  monopoly,  such  as  now  exists  with  Illinois 
mine  labor,  and  there  is  no  accompanying  responsi- 
bility or  liability  attached  to  such  labor  monopoly, 
there  is  or  can  be  no  redress  either  in  behalf  of  the 
coal  operators  or  of  the  public  who  suffer  as  a 
result  of  such  a  condition. 

Among  the  most  important  things  for  which  not 
only  contract  provision  must  be  made,  but  also 
guaranteed  by  proper  and  adequate  legal  responsi- 
bility, are  the  following: 

1.  The  management  of  ownership  must  be  clearly 
and  definitely  established,  if  such  management  is  to 
discharge    the    responsibility   with   which    it   stands 
charged  before  the  public. 

2.  The  way  must  be  cleared  to  secure  every  pos- 
sible economic  benefit  that  may  be  derived  from  a 
more    extensive    use    of    every    sort    of    mechanical 
device   through   which   coal  cost  and   price   of  coal 
to   the   public   may   be   reduced,   even   though   such 
mechanical    utilization    may    supplant    man-power, 
which  admittedly  can  find  employment  elsewhere. 

3.  It  must  be  made  not  only  possible  but  impera- 
tive   that    through    co-operation    between    manage- 
ment and  labor,  a  dependable  and  satisfactory  prod- 
uct shall   at  all  times  be  provided,  which  shall  be 
uniform  as  to  the  established  and  recognized  quality 
of  the  particular  mine  from  which  such  coal  moves. 


Gu 


Debilitated  Authority  of 
Management 

IT  is  well  known,  and  in  common  parlance  well 
stated,  that,  "every  job  must  have  a  boss."  Every- 
one recognizes  this  as  a  fundamental  requirement 
in  every  undertaking,  whether  it  be  large  or  small. 
The  first  prime  necessity  of  successful  operation 
in  any  organization  or  enterprise  is  the  establish- 
ment and  maintenance  of  an  effective  management, 
whose  rights  and  powers  shall  be  fully  and  thor- 
oughly protected.  Otherwise  there  can  be  no  disci- 
pline or  efficiency.  With  respect  to  their  own  affairs, 
the  United  Mine  Workers  have  apparently  always 
themselves  recognized  this  principle  and  have  guar- 
anteed such  status  for  their  officers  and  representa- 
tives, by  strict  constitutional  provision  and  specific 
governing  rule. 

At  the  beginning  of  collective  bargaining  at  Illi- 
nois mines,  the  organized  mine  workers  having  se- 
cured for  themselves  the  benefit  of  the  "closed 
shop,"  were  very  willing  to  provide  contract  text 
evidence  of  their  guarantee  that  the  right  of  man- 
agement at  coal  mines  in  Illinois  should  at  all  times 
rest  exclusively  with  the  employing  coal  operator. 
This  is  indicated  by  the  following  paragraph  from 
the  contract — such  provision  having  appeared  in 
every  contract  throughout  the  entire  twenty-five 
year  period  of  joint  collective  bargaining: 

"The  right  to  hire  and  discharge,  the  management 
of  the  mine  and  the  direction  of  the  working 
forces  are  vested  exclusively  in  the  operator 
and  the  U.  M.  W.  of  A.  shall  not  abridge  this 
right.  It  is  not  the  intention  of  this  provision 
to  encourage  the  discharge  of  employes  or  the 
refusal  of  employment  to  applicants  because  of 
personal  prejudice  or  activity  in  matters  affect- 
ing the  U.  M.  W.  of  A." 

Then  follows  a  detailed  provision  for  method  of 
procedure  when  "it  is  claimed  that  an  injustice  has 
been  done"  to  a  discharged  employe,  and  in  what 
manner  and  under  what  circumstances  such  an  em- 
ploye shall  be  reinstated, — and  not  only  this,  but 
also  compensated  for  all  time  he  has  lost. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  and  this  will  be  readily  un- 
derstood by  every  employer  of  labor,  the  operator's 
ability  under  such  conditions,  to  discharge  employes 
that  are  for  any  reason  unsatisfactory,  is  essentially 
negligible,  and  particularly  so  when  it  is  well  un- 
derstood that  extensive  mine  idleness  is  very  apt  to 
be  precipitated  because  of  the  union's  latter  day 
assumption  of  entire  right  to  strike  whenever  they 
may  decide  such  course  is  expedient  and  to  their 
advantage,  wholly  without  reference  to  the  contract 
provision  which  specifically  provides  that  no  such 
action  may  be  taken  prior  to  the  hearing  of  the 
case  and  its  final  decision. 

Although  the  mine  management  may  at  times  un- 
justly penalize  an  employe  through  discharge,  and 
to  protect  against  such  contingency  means  are  pro- 
vided under  the  contract  to  review  such  action,  and 
as  a  result  of  such  hearing,  some  men  are  rein- 
stated, with  the  operator  paying  penalty  for  his 
error,  —  in  the  way  of  compensation  during  the 
idleness  of  the  discharged  employe,  —  no  equally 
adequate  penalty  is  possible  for  an  equally  unwar- 
ranted damage  done  to  the  operator,  as  a  result  of  a 


local  mine  strike  called  to  compel  the  reinstatement 
of  a  discharged  employe,  even  before  the  time  such 
discharged  employe's  case  had  been  heard  and 
decided. 

This  lack  of  mutuality  in  operation  under  the  con- 
tract is,  of  course,  not  .only  inequitable,  but  calcu- 
lated to  accomplish  just  what  has  occurred,  essen- 
tially complete  vacation  of  every  guarantee  which  it 
was  sought  to  secure  by  such  provision. 

In  every  large  group  of  working  men,  it  is  also 
well  known  by  every  employer  that  there  are  cer- 
tain to  be  some  whose  work,  as  well  as  general 
qualifications,  physical,  mental  or  moral,  do  not 
prove  satisfactory  to  the  management  or  continue 
at  all  times  to  be  in  harmony  with  the  general  sur- 
roundings at  a  given  plant.  It  is,  therefore,  apparent 
that  there  should  .be  no  restriction  of  the  right  to 
release  such  a  man.  It  has  come  to  be  impossible, 
however,  to  do  so  except  upon  the  basis  of  formal 
charge,  full,  detailed  and  complete  hearings,  and  final 
universal  agreement  on  the  part  of  the  representa- 
tives of  the  individual — all  of  which  it  will 'be  readily 
understood  is  extremely  difficult  to  secure— in  many 
cases,  impossible.  In  consequence,  the  working  force 
is  made  less  efficient  and  management  that  much 
less  respected  as  a  result  of  the  repeated  knowl- 
edge of  the  successful  resistance  of  a  discharged 
employe  whom  the  other  workmen  may  know  should 
and  would  have  been  discharged  but  for  the  activity 
of  their  union  organization. 

DENIAL   OF   RIGHT  TO   MAKE   PHYSICAL 

EXAMINATION   OF  APPLICANTS 

FOR  WORK. 

The  miners'  organization  has  persistently  re- 
fused to  permit  any  coal  producing  company  in  the 
state  to  formally  establish  as  one  of  the  regular 
conditions  of  employment,  a  rule  demanding  that 
every  applicant  must  submit  himself  to  physical 
examination.  In  the  operation  of  a  coal  mine  or  any 
other  industrial  plant,  it  is  well  understood  that  men 
should  be  selected  with  due  regard  to  their  quali- 
fications for  various  jobs,  and  that  the  physical 
fitness  of  a  man  for  a  given  task  should  be  fully 
determined  before  he  is  assigned  to  it.  This  is 
particularly  true  where  the  class  and  kind  of  work 
demands  not  only  sound  physical  condition,  but 
also  reasonable  perfection  of  vision  and  such  agility 
as  comes  only  with  entire  freedom  from  physical 
defect  that  would  either  occasion  or  promote  likeli- 
hood of  accident  to  the  individual  applicant  or  to 
others  working  with  him. 

There  are  many  physical  infirmities  and  deflec- 
tions from  normal  that,  without  such  physical 
examination,  must  remain  unknown  to  the  employer 
when  a  man  is  hired. 

Minor  deformities,  limitation  of  motion  of  an  arm 
or  leg  from  previous  fractures  or  dislocations,  de- 
flection of  the  spine,  various  forms  of  rupture  as 
well  as  many  other  conditions  limiting  motion. 

There  are  also  numerous  systemic  disorders  and 
infections,  including  organic  and  functional  derange- 
ments than  can  only  be  discovered  through  exam- 
ination. 

Such  examinations  to  determine  fitness  would 
not  necessarily  deny  opportunity  for  work  to  every 
applicant  who  may  exhibit  some  abnormal  con- 
dition. 


Work  of  a  kind  or  in  a  place  where  his  handicap 
does  not  jeopardize  him  or  others,  can  often  be 
found. 

It  is  absolutely  unjust  to  employ  or  to  be  com- 
pelled to  employ  an  individual  in  a  task  for  which 
he  is  physically  unfit,  and  to  pay  such  an  unfit 
employee  the  full  rate  granted  to  the  sound  man; 
and  through  such  employment  to  incur  the  risk  of 
almost  certain  accident,  with  unfortunate  results  to 
the  individual  injured  and,  under  the  provision  of 
the  Compensation  Law,  imposing  a  direct  addition 
to  the  cost  of  coal  to  the  operator,  reflected  in  the 
price  of  coal  to  the  public. 

The  public  are  very  directly  interested  in  this 
subject.  It  must  be  remembered  that  coal  miners 
are  among  the  specially  favored  class  of  labor  that 
are  benefited  by  the  adoption  of  the  principle  of 
compensating  workmen  killed  or  injured  in  industry. 
Labor  in  the  coal  industry  no  longer  bears  the 
burden  of  the  economic  loss  arising  from  fatalities 
and  injuries.  This  obligation  has  in  Illinois  been 
fully  and  completely  transferred  to  the  coal  con- 
sumer through  the  application  of  the  compulsory 
compensation  law  now  in  effect  in  every  Illinois 
mine.  This  item  alone  has  increased  the  con- 
sumer's coal  cost  about  5c  per  ton  since  the  law 
became  effective  in  1917.  It  should  also  be  remem- 
bered that  the  indulgence  of  the  public  in  accept- 
ing this  economic  burden  is  not  shared  by  all  labor, 
but  is  for  the  enjoyment  only  of  a  limited  number 
of  certain  specified  classes. 

$3,032,253.00  was  paid  out  in  behalf  of  Illinois 
mine  workers  in  1920.  This  was  approximately  one- 
third  of  the  total  amount  paid  out  under  the  Com- 
pensation Act  in  Illinois  that  year.  Even  so  recent- 
ly as  five  years  ago,  mine  workers  injured,  or  their 
dependents  if  it  be  a  fatality,  enjoyed  no  such  con- 
sideration. 

Mr.  Frank  Farrington,  president  of  the  United 
Mine  Workers  in  Illinois,  in  his  most  recent  report 
to  his  membership,  states  "miners  have  collected 
more  than  their  proportion  of  the  compensation, 
but  as  was  said  in  the  former  report,  this  does  not 
mean  that  the  miners  have  received  more  compen- 
sation than  they  were  entitled  to." 

Mechanical  Devices  for  the 
Reduction  of  Coal  Cost 

ONE  of  the  matters   called  particularly  to  the 
attention    of    the    United    States    Bituminous 
Coal     Commission,    appointed    by     President 
Wilson    in    December    1919,    was    the    necessity    of 
granting    to    the    operators    the    unabridged,    unre- 
stricted right  to  use  any  and  every  kind  of  mechan- 
ical device  by  which  coal  cost  might  be  reduced. 

The  award  of  this  commission  was  confusing, 
uncertain  and  wholly  unsatisfactory,  in  that  it  was 
essentially  punitive  rather  than  helpful  in  its  pro- 
visions, so  far  as  the  coal  operators  were  concerned, 
and  made  the  utilization  of  such  devices  an  addi- 
tional expense  instead  of  offering  an  opportunity 
for  the  reduction  of  coal  cost.  The  last  sentence  of 
the  commissions'  award  on  labor  saving  mechanical 
devices  reading  as  follows: 

"The  mine  worker  shall  receive  the  equiva- 
lent of  the  contract  rates  for  the  class  of  work 
displaced,  plus  a  fair  proportion  of  the  labor 
savings  effected." 


Of  course  there  is  no  cost  saving  if  the  full  con- 
tract rates  for  displaced  labor  are  to  be  paid. 
Fewer  men  might  be  used  through  the  utilization 
of  mechanical  devices,  but  this  few  would  receive 
all  of  the  benefits  previously  accruing  to  the  entire 
number  displaced. 

COAL  UNDERCUTTING  MACHINES. 

In  Illinois  mines,  all  of  which  are  entirely  domi- 
nated by  the  United  Mine  Workers'  organization, 
the  only  present  device  brought  into  actual  contact 
with  the  coal,  and  that  is  used  to  do  a  part  of  the 
work  of  mining  and  removal  from  the  coal  seam,  is 
the  so-called  undercutting  machine.  There  are 
several  varieties  of  these,  but  all  discharge  the  same 
essential  function,  i.  e.,  they  undercut  the  coal, 
which  is  a  substantial  portion  of  the  work  of  re- 
moval. On  this  account,  and  since  the  miner,  who 
originally  did  by  hand  and  explosives  all  the  work 
of  removal  and  received  therefor  a  certain  amount 
per  ton,  it  is  patent  that  there  should  be  some  al- 
lowance made  from  the  hand  mining  rate  for  this 
undercutting. 

In  Illinois  mines,  the  amount  allowed  for  the 
provision  by  the  operators  of  this  undercutting 
machine,  the  power  to  operate  it,  the  necessary 
repair,  upkeep  and  final  depreciation  of  its  original 
cost,  is  only  7c  per  ton. 

This  7c  does  not  cover  the  items  indicated  and 
these  machines  are  therefore  operated  at  a  flat  loss 
to  the  coal  producing  companies. 

Illinois  coal  producers  are  also  the  victims  of 
discrimination  in  connection  with  their  effort  to 
use  these  machines,  being  seriously  handicapped  and 
out  of  line  competitively  with  coal  operators  in 
other  districts  of  the  country  where  the  amount 
allowed  by  the  miners  from  the  pick  mining  rate, 
for  exactly  the  same  service  rendered  in  Illinois, 
varies  from  a  minimum  of  12c  to  as  much  as  22c, 
as  against  the  7c  ONLY  allowed  in  Illinois. 

Therefore,  the  paramount  reasons  for  the  con- 
tinued use  of  undercutting  machines  in  Illinois 
mines  are  to  reduce  injuries  to  men,  damage  to 
property,  and  degradation  of  product  arising  from 
the  excessive  use  of  explosives  by  "hand"  miners. 

No  reduction  whatever  of  cost  is  possible,  al- 
though the  miner's  work  is  materially  reduced,  and 
through  the  increase  in  tonnage  brought  down  and 
that  he  can  load  in  a  given  time,  his  earning  ability 
is  substantially  greater.  Coal  loaders  aker  under- 
cutting machines,  have  net  earnings  of  20  to  25% 
more  than  so-called  pick  miners  who  do  all  their 
own  work  without  any  such  mechanical  assistance. 

COAL  CUTTING  AND  LOADING  MACHINES. 

There  is  a  large  number  and  a  wide  variety  of 
these  machines  now  in  operation  in  the  non-union 
fields,  and  through  the  use  of  such  machines  half 
the  number  of  men  will  produce  many  times  the 
volume  of  coal  possible  to  hand  workers. 

The  arbitrary  rules  of  the  Miners'  union  forbid 
any  and  all  advantage  that  might  arise  from  the  use 
of  this  class  of  machines.  Repeated  attempts  have 
been  made  by  Illinois  operators,  to  reach  an  agree- 
ment with  the  mine  workers  for  the  use  of  such 
machinery,  but  in  every  instance  the  scale  rate  de- 
manded by  the  union  organization  has  made  any 
cost  saving  utilization  impossible. 

6 


COAL  DRILLING 

For  precisely  the  same  reason,  all  Illinois  coal 
still  continues  even  to  this  day,  to  be  drilled  by 
hand.  Two  hours  of  time  are  required  to  do  by 
hand  what  might  be  as  well  or  better  done,  by 
power  drill,  in  a  very  few  minutes.  But  neither  the 
consent  of  the  union  organization,  nor  such  reduc- 
tion of  the  established  mining  rate  can  be  secured, 
as  will  warrant  the  installation  of  the  necessary 
facilities  to  establish  power  drilling  as  a  possible 
practice  in  Illinois  mines.  And  this  is  true  regard- 
less of  the  fact  that  the  individual  miner  would, 
through  release  from  such  drilling,  have  the  addi- 
tional time  in  which  to  load  a  greater  volume  of 
coal  which  someone  else,  with  the  aid  of  such  me- 
chanical devices,  would  make  ready  for  him  to  load. 

In  any  system  of  human  effort,  professional  or 
industrial,  the  best  results  are  secured  through  the 
development  of  special  skill  or  fitness  to  do  a  part 
of  the  job  instead  of  the  whole  job.  This  can  be 
done  in  the  coal  mining  industry  through  breaking 
up  the  present  practice  of  having  the  individual 
miner,  drill,  shoot  and  load  coal  and  such  change 
will  result  in  increased  instead  of  decreased  earn- 
ings to  him. 

WHY  THE  PUBLIC  PAYS 

However  much  organized  labor  may  resist,  as  it 
always  has  resisted,  mechanical  utilization,  it  is 
none  the  less  true  that  every  progressive  industry, 
either  large  or  small,  from  the  littlest  farm  to  the 
most  extensive  industrial  plant,  has  accomplished 
much  if  not  most  of  its  developed  efficiency  and 
lowered  cost  of  commodity,  through  the  increasing 
use  of  mechanical  devices. 

Wide  discussion  arises  from  the  fact  that  too 
many  men  have  sought  to  secure  an  income  in  the 
coal  industry  and  are  still  being  received  and 
stay  therein,  wholly  as  a  result  of  the  fact  that 
present  wages  paid  at  bituminous  mines  are  dis- 
proportionately high  as  compared  with  other 
industries,  and  with  the  character  of  work  done.  It 
is  universally  recognized  that  this  condition  must 
be  remedied. 

As  another  means  of  reducing  such  excess, 
Illinois  operators  propose  in  connection  with  the 
present  wage  scale  negotiations,  to  make  every 
possible  effort,  and  struggle  to  the  limit  of  their 
present  ability,  to  secure  such  change  in  the  work- 
ing conditions  set  up  in  the  present  state  contract 
with  the  miners,  as  will  permit  the  freest  possible 
use  of  every  mechanical  device  and  arrangement, 
calculated  to  reduce  coal  cost,  thereby  reducing  the 
number  of  hand-work  men  now  necessary  to  pro- 
duce the  present  volume  of  coal. 

Clean  Coal 

NEXT  to  the  unabridged  right  of  management 
in  every  establishment,  comes  the  importance 
of  providing  regularly  a  uniform  and  satis- 
factory product. 

On  this  point  also,  the  miners'  organization  at  the 
outset  of  our  joint  relations  were  equally  out- 
spoken in  their  acknowledgment  of  the  necessity 
for  fully  protecting  operators  in  this  particular,  and 
we  have  several  specific  contract  provisions  that, 
fully  observed  by  the  mine  workmen,  are  apparently 
calculated  to  guarantee  desired  results.  That  they 
do  not  is  simply  another  phase  of  the  slowly  grow- 
ing but  constantly  developing  contract  delinquency. 


"QUALITY  OF  COAL:  The  scale  of  prices  for 
mining  *  *  *  is  understood  in  every  case  to  be  for 
coal  practically  free  from  slate,  bone  and  other  im- 
purities." 

At  those  Illinois  mines  where  serious  effort  is 
made  to  provide  consumers  with  clean  coal,  the 
amount  of  impurities  removed  by  day  men  (not  by 
the  loaders  as  the  contract  contemplates)  averages 
about  3%  of  the  total  hoisted  weight  of  coal.  This 
impurity  removal,  together  with  the  amount  paid  for 
such  weight,  when  the  miner  is  credited  for  the 
total  weight  of  the  contents  of  his  car  sent  up, 
varies  from  10  to  15c  per  ton.  This  amount  does 
not  cover  the  additional  cost  of  special  preparation 
and  sizing  of  coal. 

PENALTIES   FOR   LOADING   IMPURITIES: 

Under  this  title,  two  pages  of  the  agreement  are 
devoted  to  a  detailed  presentation  of  methods  to  be 
pursued  in  determining  such  penalties,  the  final 
paragraph  reading, 

"The  foregoing  is  designed  to  insure  to  the 
operator  the  loading  of  clean  coal,  while  pro- 
tecting the  miner  from  the  penal  provision." 

The  fines  imposed  range  from  50c  for  the  first 
offense  to  as  high  as  $2.00  for  the  third,  or  in  lieu 
of  such  latter  fine  the  offending  miner  may  be 
suspended  for  three  days  of  mine  operation.  One 
feature  of  this  penalty  arrangement  is  that  each  of 
the  three  offenses  must  occur  in  the  same  calendar 
month,  if  the  amount  of  the  fine  is  increased.  For 
$1.50  a  month,  therefore,  a  miner  might  twenty-four 
times  each  year,  load  out  impurities,  and  be  in  no 
.danger  whatever,  even  of  suspension. 

For  so-called  "malicious  or  aggravated  cases"  the 
contract  does  provide  for  outright  discharge,  the 
technical  requirements  for  procedure  in  such  cases, 
however,  makes  the  effort  to  secure  such  discharge, 
fully  equivalent  to  a  suit  at  law. 

In  the  last  five  years,  there  have  been  only  'thirty 
discharge  cases  for  aggravated  offenses,  or  about 
one  case  out  of  every  five  taken  up. 

The  so-called  "dock  bosses"  who  inspect  coal  as 
it  passes  over  the  screen  are  generally  heartily  dis- 
liked and  are  frequently  the  subject  of  assault. 

Today,  miners  are  not  only  neglectful  in  the 
matter  of  providing  clean  coal  in  the  mines  of  good 
natural  conditions,  but  insist,  after  accepting  em- 
ployment at  less  fortunate  mines,  upon  demanding 
premium  payment  for  what  they  call  working  in  a 
deficient  place,  meaning  a  place  in  the  mine  where 
the  work  and  difficulty  of  removing  impurities  from 
the  coal  seam  is  perhaps  above  the  average. 

In  the  earlier  days  when  these  contracts  were 
first  entered  into,  it  was  fully  understood  that  it  re- 
quired time,  patience  and  some  skill  to  so  mine  and 
load  coal  so  as  to  avoid  contamination  with  either 
overlying  slate,  or  underlying  fire  clay;  to  carefully 
remove  bone  coal,  slate  or  similar  formations  that 
occurred  in  some  parts  of  the  seam,  but  it  was  ac- 
cepted as  a  part  of  the  assumed  obligation  under 
the  contract  and  done,  it  being  definitely  under- 
stood by  each  miner  that  if  he  accepted  employ- 
ment at  a  mine  where  conditions  were  such  as  to 
make  certain  that  the  work  of  impurity  removal 
would  be  much  harder,  he  would  have  to  do  that 
much  more  than  men  employed  at  mines  where  the 
natural  conditions  in  the  coal  seam  were  better. 


As  a  direct  result  of  this  gradually  changing  view- 
point of  mine  workmen,  a  very  heavy  burden  of 
expense  has  been  laid  upon  the  coal  producing  com- 
panies in  providing  extra  day  men  to  do  work  that 
the  loaders,  under  the  terms  of  the  contract, 
should  do. 


COAL  DEGRADATION  THROUGH  DEVEL- 
OPMENT OF  AN  EXCESS  OF  SCREENINGS: 
On  this  point  the  contract  reads, 

"The  system  of  paying  for  coal  before  screen- 
ing was  intended  to  obviate  the  many  conten- 
tions incident  to  the  use  of  screens,  and  was 
not  intended  to  encourage  unworkmanlike 
methods  in  mining  and  blasting  of  coal  or  to 
decrease  the  percentage  of  screened  lump,  and 
the  operators  are  hereby  guaranteed  the  hearty 
support  and  co-operation  of  the  United  Mine 
Workers  of  America  in  disciplining  any  miner 
who  from  ignorance  or  carelessness,  or  other 
cause,  fails  to  properly  mine,  shoot  and  load 
his  coal." 

Despite  this  very  clear  and  explicit  contract  pro- 
vision and  the  repeated  assurance  of  mine  workers' 
representatives,  the  percentage  of  screenings  pro- 
duced at  Illinois  mines  has  increased  during  the  last 
fifteen  years  from  a  maximum  of  25%  of  the  total 
output,  to  a  constant  average  at  the  present  time 
of  around  50%  of  total  hoisted  weight  of  coal.  This 
showing  also  is  made,  regardless  of  the  fact  that 
over  62%  of  coal  production  today  is  from  mines 
where  solid  shooting  has  been  discontinued  and 
the  coal  is  undercut  by  mining  machines,  blasting 
shots  are  fired  by  special  men  provided  for  the 
purpose  and  every  possible  effort  has  been  made 
by  the  operators  in  such  use  of  machines  and  in 
the  reduced  use  of  explosives,  to  keep  the  produc- 
tion of  screenings  at  a  minimum. 

Screenings  always  sell  in  normal  times  for  less 
than  cost,  such  loss  is  therefore  of  necessity  carried 
over  to  the  prepared  sizes,  lump,  furnace,  small  egg, 
which  are  the  grades  required  particularly  by  the 
householder  and  small  steam  consumers. 

Steam  users  generally  are  in  consequence  today 
paying  only  from  one-half  to  two-thirds  as  much  per 
ton  for  screenings  on  board  cars  at  the  mine  as 
other  users  are  paying  for  the  prepared  sizes.  When 
burned  in  appropriate  furnaces,  both  have  identical 
fuel  values.  In  addition  to  which  there  are  many 
instances  where  the  freight  rates  on  screenings  are 
lower  than  on  the  larger  sizes.  Such  reduction  in 
freight  rate  is  justified,  and  in  fact  made  imperative, 
in  order  that  wider  markets  may  be  found  in  which 
this  disparaged  but  rapidly  increasing  grade  of  coal 
can  be  disposed  of.  All  of  this  loss  to  the  coal 
operator,  to  the  consumer  of  prepared  sizes  and  to 
the  railroad  in  lowered  revenue,  arises  from  the 
failure  of  mine  workmen  to  pursue  workmanlike 
methods  in  mining  the  coal. 

The  problem  of  preventing  the  needless  punish- 
ment and  breakage  of  coal  by  excessive  use  of  ex- 
plosives, indifferent  and  careless  mining  practice 
and  otherwise,  all  of  which  is  the  direct  occasion 
of  this  wasteful  and  increasing  amount  of  screen- 
ings, is  one  of  the  largest  problems  that  constantly 
confronts  Illinois  coal  producers  today. 


Strikes  and  Other  Embarrass- 
ments to  Mine  Operation 

WHILE  admittedly  mines  are  thrown  idle  by 
mechanical  difficulties,  or  break-downs;  by 
lack  of  railroad  cars  and  by  lack  of  market 
demand,  such  idleness  arises  solely  as  the  result  of 
presumably  inescapable  contingency  or  of  an  exist- 
ing economic  condition. 

Mine  stoppage  from  such  causes  is  a  recognized 
factor,  reasonably  accurately  known,  as  a  result  of 
many  years'  experience,  and  is  given  full  consider- 
ation at  the  time  wage  scales  are  determined  and  a 
bargain  made  with  the  mine  workers'  representa- 
tives covering  the  conditions  under  which,  with  all 
these  things  considered,  coal  will,  during  a  fixed 
period,  be  mined  by  their  membership,  for  the 
operating  companies  with  whom  they  make  such 
contract. 

It  is  for  this  reason  that  wage  rates  paid  to 
miners  for  all  classes  of  work  have  for  many  years 
been  substantially  higher  than  the  wage  rates  for 
similar  service  in  other  industries. 

Enforced  idleness  of  a  mine  occasioned  by  a 
strike  of  the  workmen,  under  an  existing  contract, 
cannot  therefore  in  any  degree  be  justified  because 
of  these  before  mentioned  contingencies  or  eco- 
nomic conditions  which  have  been  taken  care  of 
in  the  original  wage  contract  consideration  and 
adjustment. 

LOCAL  MINE  STRIKES 

This  class  of  strikes  are  therefore  not  only  a 
violation  of  the  contract  but  indefensible.  They  are 
a  clear  manifestation  of  entire  willingness,  in  fact 
determination,  to  utilize  a  weapon,  "the  exercise  of 
their  economic  power,"  which  they  have  explicitly 
guaranteed  not  to  use. 

The  contract  reads: 

"Independent  action  may  be  resorted  to  only 
in  matters  outside  of  the  contract  relation;  or 
when  the  other  party  to  the  dispute  refuses  to 
submit  to  arbitration."  Again,  "in  all  cases  of 
dispute  the  miners  and  the  mine  laborers  and 
all  parties  involved  shall  continue  at  work, 
pending  a  trial  and  adjustment  until  a  final 
decision  is  reached  under  the  provisions  herein 
set  forth." 

Regardless  of  specific  agreement,  Illinois  oper- 
ators continue  constantly  to  be  harassed  with  local 
mine  strikes  for  the  arbitrary  enforcement  of  some 
local  or  district  demand  made  by  the  miners  in 
flagrant  violation  of  the  wage  contract. 

Many  if  not  all  of  these  strikes  are  precipitated 
upon  the  slightest  possible  pretext  and  for  causes 
that  are  wholly  trivial  and  out  of  all  proportion  to 
the  loss  suffered  either  by  the  miners  or  the  mine 
owners,  as  a  result  of  such  mine  idleness. 

10 


It  is  true,  of  course,  that  the  contract  provides 
for  penalties  that  shall  apply  in  cases  of  this  kind, 
but  the  application  of  such  penalties  contemplates 
the  existence  of  an  established  regulatory  authority 
within  the  miners'  organization  that  will  seek  con- 
scientiously to  compel  contract  observation.  It  is, 
however,  frequently  ascertained  that  such  status 
does  not  exist,  or  at  least  is  promptly  effective  in 
only  a  relatively  small  percentage  of  such  cases. 

It  has  apparently  come  to  be  felt  by  miners'  rep- 
resentatives that  contract  obligation  is  fully  dis- 
charged if,  after  one  to  three  days  of  unjustifiable 
idleness,  the  men  are  finally  compelled,  or  rather 
pursuaded,  to  go  back  to  work,  and  that  in  conse- 
quence no  fine  or  other  penalty  should  be  required. 
THE  AUTOMATIC  PENALTY  CLAUSE 

The  elimination  of  which  the  miners  are  at  this 
time  demanding,  was  set  up  and  authorized  by  the 
direct  order  of  the  United  States  Fuel  Administra- 
tion, in  November  1917,  for  the  purpose  of  guaran- 
teeing to  the  maximum  possible  extent  the  elimin- 
ation of  the  so-called  "wild  cat"  local  mine  strikes. 

For  many  years  prior  to  the  establishment  of  this 
automatic  penalty  clause,  our  wage  agreements  pro- 
vided fines  to  be  imposed  upon  individual  or  groups 
of  miners  who  wilfully  threw  a  mine  wholly  or  in 
part  idle  by  strike  or  otherwise.  The  application  of 
such  fines,  however,  were  subject  to  joint  determin- 
ation by  a  board  composed  of  operators  and  miners' 
representatives  and  as  a  result  such  fines  were, 
through  repeated  delays  occasioned  by  the  miners, 
and  their  recourse  to  technicalities,  seldom  or  never 
collected,  no  matter  how  flagrant  the  case.  The 
miners'  representatives  were  uniformly  averse  to 
participating  in  such  penalization. 

The  automatic  clause  provides  that  "the  collec- 
tion of  all  such  fines  shall  be  automatic,"  that  is, 
checked  off  by  operators  from  the  first  money 
earned  and  due  to  such  offending  employes.  This 
procedure  makes  it  difficult  for  miners'  representa- 
tives to  subsequently  do  otherwise  than  permit 
such  penalization  to  stand. 

STATE  WIDE  STRIKES 

Are  -not,  however,  adequately  reached  by  the 
automatic  penalty  clause.  This  is  true  whether 
such  strike  shall  be  with  or  without  the  authoriza- 
tion or  supine  acquiescence  of  the  state  or  national 
officials.  Nor  under  any  voluntary  agreement  which 
lacks  the  support  of  the  full  legal  responsibility  of 
either  party,  so  that  each  or  either  of  such  parties 
may  be  sued  for  damage,  can  a  proper  or  adequate 
remedy  be  applied  to  prevent  such  strikes. 

The  widespread  strikes  in  Illinois  during  the 
period  from  July  to  September  1919,  and  involving 
at  times  as  much  as  60%  of  the  producing  capacity 
of  the  state;  and  again  the  complete  shut-down  of 
the  state  in  July  1920,  in  both  instances  demanding 
11 


essential,  entire  abrogation  of  an  existing  contract, 
are  simply  manifestations  either  of  absolute  loss  of 
control  by  labor  leaders  or  their  complacent  ac- 
ceptance of  a  difficult  situation  the  damage  of  which 
they  realize  will  be  borne  elsewhere  than  by  them 
or  their  membership. 

It  is  just  here  that  the  real  burden  of  irresponsi- 
bility is  made  clearly  apparent  to  the  public  as  an 
unwarranted  load  they  are  compelled  to  carry. 
Mine  strikes  seldom  occur  when -times  are  bad  and 
market  demand  light.  The  assault  comes  rather 
when,  because  the  public  wants  coal,  the  operator  is 
anxious  to  run  his  mine  and  would  seem  to  be 
vulnerable  to  attack. 

ABSENTEEISM 

In  coal  mining  as  in  every  other  industry  having 
inter-dependent  units,  the  absence  of  a  portion  of 
the  workmen  disturbs  the  entire  operation,  reduces 
efficiency  and  output  and  increases  cost.  Absence  of 
six  or  eight  of  the  employes  who  are  in  charge  of 
the  haulage  of  coal  from  the  working  places  in  the 
mine  to  the  shaft  bottom,  seriously  curtails  the 
production  for  the  day  and  may  in  consequence  in- 
crease the  cost  for  that  day  as  much  as  25  cents 
per  ton  solely  because  of  the  reduction  of  output. 
This  is  only  one  illustration;  there  are  numerous 
other  embarrassments  to  operation  with  attendant 
increase  of  cost,  that  arise  solely  from  absenteeism. 
Under  the  existing  wage  agreement,  an  employe 
may  be  discharged  only  "when  he  absents  himself 
from  his  work  for  a  period  of  two  days,  without  the 
consent  of  the  company,  other  than  because  of 
proven  sickness. 

Another  part  of  the  contract  provides,  "if  any 
employe  shall  be  suspended  or  discharged  by  the 
company  and  it  is  claimed  that  an  injustice  has 
been  done  him,  an  investigation  shall  be  con- 
ducted *  *  *  and  if  it  is  proven  *  *  *  the  operator 
shall  reinstate  *  *  *  and  such  employe  shall  receive 
compensation  during  the  period  of  his  suspension 
or  discharge." 

It  will  be  seen  at  once  that  disciplinary  suspen- 
sion or  discharge  is  therefore  made  difficult  if  not 
impossible. 

Apologists  for  this  frequent  embarrassment  of 
mine  operation  with  the  attending  increase  in  the 
cost  of  coal  that  follows  as  a  direct  result,  insist 
that  "A  fair  interpretation  *  *  *  is  that  an  ir- 
regular industry  breeds  irregular  habits  among  the 
workers.  When  the  men  are  not  accustomed  to 
going  to  work  regularly  every  morning,  the  incen- 
tive for  regular  working  becomes  less  potent  and 
a  certain  amount  of  absenteeism  inevitably  results. 
This  is  the  psychological .  factor  of  irregularity,  and 
it  may  be  expected  that  it  will  disappear  in  large 
measure  as  the  industry  becomes  more  stable." 
12 


In  view  of  the  fact  there  is  no  prospect  of  secur- 
ing more  than  improvement  as  to  regularity  of 
mine  operation,  and  that  from  the  very  nature  of 
the  business  and  the  inherent  impossibility  of  ever 
approximating  the  regular  work  time  of  factory  and 
other  industrial  workers,  it  would  seem  that  there 
are  those  who  do  not  believe  that  any  positive  effort 
should  be  made  to  reduce  this  growing  practice. 
It  is  worth  noting,  in  passing,  that  within  the  ex- 
perience of  coal  operators,  absenteeism  always 
reaches  a  minimum  that  closely  approximates  the 
absenteeism  in  other  industries  in  every  instance 
where  the  wage  rate  paid  to  miners  more  closely' ap- 
proximates that  paid  in  other  industries.  But  while 
two  or  three  days'  work  in  a  coal  mine  will  bring 
returns  possible  only  to  others  for  a  full  week's 
work,  absenteeism  will  continue  as  an  abuse  at 
coal  mines. 

HOLIDAYS 

The  wage  contract  provides  for  six  holidays  each 
year  and  says, 

"these  shall  be  the  only  holidays  under  this 
agreement." 

County  fairs,  special  celebrations  and  occurrences, 
and  the  observance  of  various  saints'  days,  add  regu- 
larly each  year,  however,  an  average  of  about 
twelve  to  fifteen  additional  days  that  at  some  time 
during  the  annual  period  affects  every  mine  in  the 
state.  So  definite  and  regular  is  the  entire  indiffer- 
ence of  the  average  miner,  and  of  their  representa- 
tives, to  the  complete  vacation  of  this  provision  that 
for  some  years  last  past  almost  no  effort  has  been 
made  to  secure  penalty  application  in  these  cases. 
As  with  other  delinquencies  that  are  annoying  and 
that  involve  additional  expense,  not  always  either 
minor  expense,  the  cost  has  simply  been  carried 
over  into  the  general  account  and  corrective  effort 
practically  abandoned. 

The  Check-Off 

The  attitude  of  the  miners  with  respect  to  the 
check-off  is  very  well  stated  by  one  of  their  own 
number  in  an  address  before  one  of  the  earliest 
joint  conferences.  He  said:  "When  the  operators 
enter  into  a  contract  with  the  United  Mine  Workers 
of  America,  they  do  so  believing  that  the  officials  of 
that  organization  will  enforce  the  terms  of  that  con- 
tract. '  *  *  *  If  that  be  true,  and  it  surely  is, 
haven't  we  the  right  to  demand  that  every  employe 
be  in  our  organization,  and  obligated  to  obey  our 
mandates  in  order  that  he  may  deliver  the  goods? 
*  *  *  -phe  operators  know  that  if  their  employes 
try  to  get  away  from  the  terms  of  the  contract,  all 
they  need  to  do  is  to  notify  the  officials  and  they 
will  go  there  and  get  them  in  line.  They  also  know 
that  it  takes  money  to  make  the  mare  go.  They  also 
know  that  the  miners  pay  a  monthly  tax,  and  that 
13 


dues  are  no  greater  when  they  are  checked  off  than 
when  they  are  paid  voluntarily;  but  dues  we  must 
have  or  we  cannot  keep  up  this  joint  agreement." 

Regardless  of  this  very  brave  assurance  of  disci- 
pline to  be  unfailingly  exercised  and  which  would 
guarantee  the  performance  of  every  member  under 
contract, — strikes  and  stoppage  of  mine  operation 
have  always  had  to  be  met,  and  to  an  increasing  de- 
gree year  after  year. 

It  is  also  a  fact  that  whereas  the  original  demand 
of  the  miners  contemplated  only  the  check-off  of 
dues  and  assessments  for  the  direct  and  immediate 
purpose  of  the  organization  including  also  the  pay- 
ment of  check-weighman,  and  of  certain  sick  and 
death  benefits,  the  scope  of  the  check-off  has  been 
steadily  enlarged  both  as  to  amounts  paid  to  the 
national,  to  the  state  and  to  the  local  organizations. 

In  recent  years  also  miners'  locals — the  unit  'of 
organization  of  employes  at  a  single  mine, — have 
been  permitted  to  levy  additional  assessments  for 
use  in  their  own  local  enterprises,  such  as  sending 
out  special  committees  or  representatives,  building 
a  hall  or  labor  temple  of  their  own,  the  establish- 
ment of  co-operative  stores,  and  other  activities  of 
this  sort.  These  local  assessments  at  times  become 
very  burdensome  and  in  those  instances,  which  are 
frequent,  where  a  local  is  largely  dominated  by  a 
radical  or  extravagant  minority,  the  amount  de- 
manded and  collected  through  the  check-off  becomes 
a  severe  drain  upon  the  individual  miner  and  must 
be  paid  by  him  whether  or  not  he  likes  it  or  agrees 
with  the  principle  or  policy  so  determined. 

The  "check-off"  made  from  the  miners'  earnings, 
for  the  payment  of  their  union  dues  and  assessments, 
amounted  in  1920  to  2.46%,  and  in  1921  to  3.33% 
of  their  total  earnings. 

The  average  amount  of  such  payment  daily  per 
man  being  19.6c  for  1920,  and  28.6c  for  1921.  This 
average  has  no  bearing  on  the  number  of  days  each 
individual  worked,  it  applies  to  the  men  who  had 
temporary  employment  as  well  as  those  working 
every  day  the  mine  had  work  to  offer.  These  per 
diem  figures  are  secured  by  dividing  the  total  amount 
paid  through  the  "check-off"  fund,  by  the  total 
number  of  men-days  worked,  at  the  total  number 
of  mines  included. 

Based  upon  the  detailed  showing  of  135  mines 
for  1920,  and  for  140  mines  in  1921,  the  approximate 
total  amount  checked  off  in  behalf  of  the  mine- 
workers  organization  by  the  coal  operators  of  Illi- 
nois, was  $3,700,000.00  for  1920,  and  $4,300,000.00  for 
1921. 

This  is  an  average  per  ton  on  the  out-put  of  1920 
of  4.2c,  and  for  1921  of  6.4c  per  ton. 

Nor  does  it  seem  desirable  as  a  matter  of  public 
policy  that  the  representatives  of  an  alleged  volun- 
tary organization  in  the  State  of  Illinois,  shall  have 

14 


the  plenary  power  to  collect  and  disburse  an  average 
of  as  much  as  $4,000,000  a  year,  and  particularly 
when  such  organization,  so  financed,  and  continuing 
uninterruptedly  from  year  to  year  is  totally  and 
wholly  irresponsible  and  not  answerable  to  any  de- 
gree or  in  any  respect  to  any  established  authority 
of  the  commonwealth  or  of  the  federal  government, 
and  except  to  a  limited  extent  even  to  the  member- 
ship of  such  organization. 

It  is  reasonable  to  hope  that  a  proper  and  more 
definite  sense  of  individual  contract  responsibility 
might  eventually  develop  if  the  miners  secured 
monthly,  semi-annual  or  even  annual  statements 
showing  what  use,  in  detail,  is  made  by  the  organ- 
ization, of  the  vast  sum  of  money  collected. 

But  the  present  system  is  a  breeder  of  irresponsi- 
bility. The  individual  pays  and  gets  a  certain  class 
protection  from  a  marauding  system  that  in  itself 
renders  no  monetary  account  to  him  and  accepts  no 
responsibility  for  what  it  perpetrates  presumably  in 
his  behalf.  The  individual  is  merely  slightly  raised 
up  in  a  system  of  mass  success,  only  to  be  forever 
locked  there  through  the  inherent  limitations  of  the 
organization  that  achieved  it  for  him.  In  this  stage 
he  is  fed  a  continuous  dissertation  of  fallacious  eco- 
nomic political  propaganda  and  carried  along  with 
the  stream  of  general  social  advancement,  but  rarely 
makes  any  further  individual  progress.  How  much 
better  it  would  be  for  the  individual,  through  a  sense 
of  responsibility,  to  eventually  lift  himself  on  merit 
above  the  limited  level  of  mass  or  class  success. 

Banking  and  insurance*  of  all  kinds,  although  pub- 
lic or  quasi-public  in  their  character,  are  none  the 
less  based  upon  the  voluntary  participation  of  the 
individuals  who  utilize  such  agencies  with  the  belief 
that  the  co-operation  of  a  large  number  is  calcu- 
lated to  prove  of  benefit  to  all  participants.  Our 
state  laws  carefully  examine,  and  limit  the  activities 
of  every  such  organization  for  the  purpose  of  guar- 
anteeing that  funds  similarly  paid  and  accumulated 
shall  not  be  wasted  or  dissipated  for  other  than 
proper  purposes,  so  that  those  who  are  supposed 
to  benefit  shall  not  be  denied  a  right  for  which  they 
have  paid. 

Experience  and  the  denouements  of  the  past  few 
years  would  seem  to  make  entirely  clear  that  the 
members  of  many  union  labor  organizations  require 
a  similar  degree  of  protection  and  a  corresponding 
exercise  of  function  by  state  authorities. 

The  establishment  of  the  check-off  as  a  practice  at 
the  coal  mines  in  the  State  of  Illinois  was  largely 
a  matter  of  expediency.  First, — because  the  oper- 
ators were  inclined  at  that  time  to  take  seriously  the 
assurances  given  by  the  miners,  and  believed  that 
paid  representatives  constantly  available,  were  nec- 
essary to  secure  contract  observance  and  to  pre- 
vent recurrent  mine  idleness  arising  out  of  "wild 
15 


cat"  strikes.  Second, — because  in  the  event  of  fail- 
ure to  secure  payment  of  dues  from  all  of  the 
employes  at  a  given  mine,  it  was  the  custom  of  the 
representatives  of  the  union  to  stand  at  the  head  of 
the  shaft  when  men  were  being  lowered  into  the 
mine  to  go  to  work,  and  demand  of  the  management 
that  it  refuse  to  put  into  the  mine  any  man  who  had 
not*  paid  his  dues  to  the  union.  In  the  event  of 
refusal  and  any  such  men  were  sent  into  the  mine, 
the  union  men  who  had  paid  their  dues  were 
promptly  called  out.  As  a  result,  and  during  sev- 
eral years,  there  was  a  constant  recurrent  period 
of  three  to  four  days  following  each  pay-roll  dis- 
bursement and  while,  by  such  methods,  delinquents 
were  being  "rounded  up,"  that  every  mine  in  the 
state  was  thrown  wholly  or  in  part  idle.  These 
came  to  be  called  "card  days,"  and  were,  as  can  be 
readily  understood,  an  expensive  luxury  to  the  op- 
erators. 

Here  again  the  inadequacy  of  the  state  picketing 
laws  to  prevent  such  interference  with  work,  made 
any  control  of  such  a  situation  impossible.  Almost 
universally  mines  are  situated  at  some  little  distance 
from  towns  and  are  wholly  without  any  adequate 
police  or  other  protection,  and  under  such  circum- 
stances there  has  been  little  opportunity  for  the 
average  operating  company  to  do  more  than  sub- 
mit. 

The  automatic  check-off  of  union  dues  and  assess- 
ments guarantees,  of  course,  the  absolute  closed 
shop  which,  in  turn,  puts  every  employe  under  the 
direct  and  positive  control  of  the  union  organization. 
The  officials  of  the  miners'  organization  are  the 
alter-ego  of  every  member  of  the  union.  The  indi- 
vidual may  not  even  agree  with  the  management  re- 
garding the  manner  and  method  of  his  work  if,  in 
the  judgment  of  the  union  representatives,  his  pro- 
posed action  is  in  conflict  with  their  interpretation 
of  the  working  agreement  with  management  or  of  a 
ruling  of  the  local  union. 

Whereas  in  the  earlier  days  such  an  arrange- 
ment may  have  been  deemed  wise  and  perhaps  even 
essential,  in  order  that  union  officials  might  have 
facilities  and  power  to  guarantee  discipline  among 
men  and  provide  compliance  with  the  wage  contract, 
such  power  has  of  late  years  been  entirely  reversed 
and  much  abused  by  unscrupulous  and  ambitious 
labor  leaders,  and  is  now  directed  rather  against  the 
employer,  with  demands  always  made  in  behalf  of 
the  employes  only,  the  acquiescence  therein  by  the 
operators  being  compelled  through  threatened  or 
actual  strike. 

It  is  perfectly  apparent,  therefore,  that  the  closed 
shop  is  incompatible  with  public  welfare  except  it 
be  accompanied  by  full  responsibility  and  direct 
legal  liability  of  the  organization  enjoying  such 
status. 

16 


Method  Provided  for  Settle- 
ment of  Disputes  Arising 
Under  the  Illinois  Mine 
Wage  Contract 

Showing  the  entire  order  in  which  cases  may 
move  to  a  final  determination. 

Adjustment  may  be  secured  in  any  of  these  blocks 
(from  1  to  8),  and  the  spirit  of  the  wage  agreement 
contemplates  that  strikes  shall  not  occur  until  all 
these  indicated  agencies  have  been  exhausted. 


Employe 

with 
Mine  Manager 


Miners' 
Pit  Committee 

with 
Mine  Manager 


Miners' 
Sub-Dist.  President 

and 
Mine  Superintendent 


Miners'  Executive 

Board  Member 

and  Field  Man  of  the 

Coal  Oprs.  Assn. 


Group  Meeting 

of 

Operators   and   Miners 
Ex.  Board  Members 


Special  Commission 

1  or  2  Coal  Operators 

1  or  2  Representatives 

of  Miners'  Union 


Pull  Joint  Board 

of  all  Executive 

Representatives  of 

Operators    and    Miners 


ARBITRATION 


Referring  to  blocks  1,  2  and  3,  it  will  be  noted 
that  three  distinct  efforts  are  always  made  by  the 
employer  to  secure  settlement  before  the  case  is. 
"referred  up."  The  Mine  Manager  (sometimes 
called  "the  pit-boss"),  and  the  Mine  Superintendent 
are  company  employes  and  do  not  belong  to  the 
mine  workers'  organization.  They  represent  the 
mine  management,  the  first  below  ground,  the  sec- 
ond the  entire  plant,  above  and  below  ground. 

After  the  unsuccessful  negotiation  of  a  dispute 
between  an  employe  and  the  Mine  Manager  (or  if 
it  be  an  employe  above  ground,  the  "Top  Boss"), 
the  miner's  case  is  immediately  passed  to  the  union 
organization,  the  so-called  "pit  committee,"  being 
the  first  and  immediate  point  of  official  contact  of  the 
United  Mine  Workers  of  America  with  the  miner 
and  the  individual  company  for  whom  he  works. 
17 


Except  as  a  witness,  in  further  proceedings,  as 
indicated  in  blocks  2  and  3,  the  complaining  miner, 
does  not,  except  in  rare  instances,  participate  further 
in  the  negotiations.  The  various  officials  of  the 
mine  workers'  organization  becoming  thereafter  the 
official  advocates  and  adjusters  for  the  individual. 

4.  The   field   man   of   the   operators'  association, 
representing  the  operator,  and  the  Executive  Board 
Member,  representing  the  miner,  ordinarily  meet  for 
the  consideration  of  a  case  at  the  mine  where  the 
dispute  originated.     Proper  procedure  contemplates 
that  after  hearing  all  the  facts  presented,  they  shall 
prepare  and  each  sign  an  agreed  statement  of  fact 
covering   every   feature   of   the    subject   in   dispute, 
after   which   further   evidence   by   the   individual   is 
not  ordinarily  given.     This  rule  is  not  always  fully 
observed. 

General  practice  however  usually  carries  the  issue 
entirely  out  of  the  hands  of  those  immediately  af- 
fected for  ultimate  determination  by  the  other  agen- 
cies provided  for  by  the  wage  agreement. 

Practically  every  case  arising,  upon  the  initiative 
of  the  miners,  where  a  decision  promises  to  have 
a  bearing,  with  respect  to  the  possible  establishment 
of  a  precedent  affecting  other  districts  in  the  state — 
is  promptly  "referred  up"  in  order  that  full  consid- 
eration may  be  given  by  representatives  from  all 
sections  of  the  state,  both  operators  and  miners. 

At  times  such  cases,  having  been  found  to  apply 
to  conditions  peculiar  to  the  mine  where  the  case 
originated,  are  decided  with  a  specific,  written  pro- 
vision, that  the  decision  "shall  not  be  made  prece- 
dent" in  other  cases  of  presumably  like  sort. 

5.  A  group  board  meeting  is  composed  of  repre- 
sentatives of  operators  and  miners  from  only  one  or 
at  most  two  mining  districts  within  the  state  and 
considers  only  cases  that  have  arisen  in  such  local 
district  or  districts.  . 

In  the  event  of  failure  to  reach  an  agreement  in 
the  group  board  conference,  to  which  ordinarily  a 
substantial  number  of  cases  have  been  referred  for 
action,  the  following  action  may  be  taken: 

6.  Reference  to   a   special   commission   of   oper- 
ators   and    representatives    of    the    Miners'    Union, 
with  power  to  dispose  of  the  case. 

7.  Reference    to    the    full   joint    executive    board 
meeting,  which  is  composed  of  the  executive  officers 
of  the  operators'  and  miners'  representatives  from 
the  ENTIRE  STATE. 

8.  Reference  to  the  Arbitration  Board. 

(In  the  event  of  disagreement,  either  the  special 
commission  or  the  full  joint  executive  board  may 
also  refer  the  case  to  arbitration.) 

The  Arbitration  Board  is  composed  of  three 
members,  neither  of  whom  have  any  connection 
with  either  the  operators  or  miners.  Cases  are 
presented  in  writing  to  the  Board  and  subsequently 
argued  by  the  representatives  of  the  operators  and 
miners.  Payment  for  the  services  of  the  arbitrators 
is  borne  equally  by  the  operators  and  miners. 

Probably  85%  of  all  the  cases  arising  are  settled 
in  the  first  three  blocks  shown  on  the  diagram. 

Of  the  unsettled  disputes  passed  up  by  the  coal 
company  to  their  association  for  adjustment  and 
final  settlement,  the  individual  employe  involved 
continues  at  work,  pending  settlement,  in  probably 
99%  of  the  cases. 

18 


It  often  occurs,  however,  that  a  strike  of  one  or 
more  days  and  involving  all  or  part  of  the  working 
force  may  precede  the  final  acceptance  of  the  pre- 
scribed method  of  handling  such  disputes.  That 
individuals  or  the  entire  local  at  a  given  mine  may 
see  fit  to  act  in  flagrant  violation  of  the  contract 
and  even  for  one  or  more  days  defy  the  authority  of 
their  own  officials  is  an  index  of  the  general  loss  of 
respect  for  their  assumed  responsibility  as  set  out 
in  the  wage  contract. 

It  is  these  unauthorized  local  manifestations  that 
are  referred  to  as  "wild-cat  strikes."  Subsequent 
submission  to  orderly  procedure  in  no  manner  elim- 
inates the  loss  and  damage  arising  from  such  arbi- 
trary action.  In  many  instances  the  advance  guar- 
antee of  remission  of  fine  is  demanded  before  con- 
sent is  granted  to  have  the  case  taken  up  in  the  pre- 
scribed manner,  or  a  subsequent  strike  is  called  to 
compel  remission  of  such  fine  when  levied. 

Refusal  to  continue  at  work  occurs  only  when  it 
is  believed  by  the  miners  that  through  the  action 
of  a  group  remaining  idle  they  can  compel  the 
prompt  grant  of  a  demand,  because  the  operator  will 
not  feel  warranted  in  having  his  mine  held  idle  for 
the  period  necessary  to  carry  on  negotiations 
through  the  various  procedures  provided  for  in  the 
agreement,  any  or  all  of  which  might  of  course  be 
willfully  delayed. 

Comparatively  few  men  may,  at  times,  be  able  to 
throw  a  mine  idle,  and  against  the  wish  even  of 
a  great  majority  of  the  other  men  employed  in  and 
about  the  plant.  There  are  times  also  when  AP- 
PARENTLY only  a  few  men  are  responsible  for 
a  shut  down  of  the  mine,  but  nevertheless  they  re- 
ceive the  support  of  all  other  employes  through  fail- 
ure to  replace  such  men  or  to  attempt  any  form  of 
discipline  directed  against  them.  In  such  instances 
the  few  individuals  become  the  "cats-paw  to  drag 
the  chestnuts  out  of  the  fire,"  and  in  the  event  at 
a  later  hearing  of  the  case,  adverse  decision  is  ren- 
dered, only  a  small  number  can  be  fined  in  accord- 
ance with  the  wage  agreement,  for  throwing  the 
mine  idle. 

The  small  groups  that  can  thus  shut  a  mine  down 
are  the  drivers,  or  motormen,  engineers,  mine  ex- 
aminers, checkweighmen,  shot  firers,  mining  ma- 
chine runners  and  those  others  on  the  continuance 
of  whose  service,  all  other  employes  are  compelled 
to  depend  if  the  flow  of  coal  from  mine  room  to 
railroad  car  is  to  be  continuous. 

Twenty-five  years  of  close,  detailed  adjudication 
of  wage  agreement  provisions  in  the  coal  industry 
has  developed  a  more  or  less  highly  technical  status 
which  is  closely  analogous  to  the  jurisdictional  and 
similar  embarrassments  prevalent  in  other  indus- 
tries. 

Labor  in  the  Coal  Industry  is  probably  the  most 

19 


closely  and  completely  organized  of  all  the  major 
industries  in  the  State.  Not  a  ton  is  produced  from 
any  shipping  mine  except  by  members  of  the  United 
Mine  Workers.  The  miners'  organization  is  not 
only  fully  organized  in  every  major  and  minor  de- 
tail but  is  also  excellently  equipped  financially. 

Arbitration 

•Within  a  very  few  years  after  the  first  contract 
was  closed  with  the  miners'  organization  (1898)  an 
increasing  number  of  cases  arose  that  were  largely 
based  upon  a  technical  interpretation  of  the  lan- 
guage of  the  agreement,  or  that  found  th'eir  origin 
in  the  unfortunate  local  conditions  at  very  few 
mines.  There  was  also  gradually  added  to  the  situ- 
ation a  growing  tendency  on  the  part  of  the  repre- 
sentatives of  labor  to  sustain  the  men  on  every 
case  without  particular  reference  to  its  merits,  and 
in  the  event  of  the  refusal  of  operators  to  accede 
to  demands  made,  so-called  independent  action  was 
taken  by  the  miners,  they  exercised  their  alleged 
right  to  bring  economic  pressure  to  bear  by  calling 
a  strike  of  employes.  So  rapidly  did  this  practice 
grow  that  the  operators  eventually  sought  through 
the  operation  of  a  common  defense  fund  to  sustain 
such  of  their  membership  as  were  so  assailed.  It 
reached  a  point  of  armed  defense  on  both  sides,  so 
far  as  finance  was  concerned. 

After  the  continuance  of  such  status  for  some 
years,  and  following  the  five  and  a  half  months' 
strike  in  1910,  an  Arbitration  Commission  was  agreed 
to  and  established,  as  follows: 

"All  cases  of  dispute  which  have  taken  the  regular 
course  under  the  contract  and  have  reached  the  Joint 
Executive  Boards,  as  provided  in  the  contract,  shall 
be  passed  upon  by  said  Joint  Executive  Boards,  and 
if  they  fail  to  agree  or  reach  a  settlement,  the  case 
shall  then  be  referred  to  the  arbitrators  provided  in 
the  contract,  within  six  days  after  such  disagree- 
ment." 

In  1911  a  number  of  disputes  were  handled, 
but  subsequently  there  was  universal  refusal  on  the 
part  of  the  miners  and  their  representatives  to  per- 
mit any  further  cases  to  be  so  referred  and  there 
was  prompt  reversion  to  all  the  old  time  conditions, 
only  in  a  more  aggravated  form,  the  strike  weapon 
being  more  largely  relied  upon  to  secure  desired 
results. 

Again  the  situation  became  sufficiently  intoler- 
able to  demand  action  and  the  subject  of  arbitration 
received  a  great  deal  of  consideration  throughout 
the  six  weeks'  joint  conference  of  Illinois  coal  opera- 
tors and  miners,-  at  Peoria,  Illinois,  April  2nd  to 
May  8th,  1914.  The  attitude  of  the  parties  at  in- 
terest is  well  set  forth  by  two  representative  state- 
ments below,  which  are  taken  from  the  records  of 
that  convention. 

20 


FOR  THE  MINERS. 

"Our  people  have  a  deep  seated  prejudice  against 
this  proposed  arbitration.  We  haven't  reached  the 
stage  of  development  in  our  organization  where  our 
people  look  at  these  matters  as  some  of  us  may  do. 
The  experience  we  have  had  in  the  past  in  some  of 
the  arbitrations  that  have  taken  place  warrants  o\A 
people  viewing  with  suspicion  any  method  by  which 
disputes  can  be  arbitrated.  Our  people,  like  many 
other  organized  workers,  are  not  going  to  surrender 
the  right  to  strike  if  they  feel  they  have  a  just 
cause  to  strike  for." 

FOR  THE  OPERATORS. 

"This  is  one  time  I  wish  I  had  the  wisdom  of 
Solomon,  the  eloquence  of  Demosthenes  and  the 
patience  of  Job.  I  am  thankful,  however,  we  have 
something  in  this  convention  at  this  critical  period 
that  is  unusual.  We  appear  to  be  in  the  best  of 
humor  and  have  been  entirely  free  from  the  mem- 
orable 'parting  of  the  ways  and  settling  it  on  the 
industrial  battlefield.'  It  is  encouraging,  to  say  the 
least. 

"In  reply  to  my  friend  on  personal  liberty,  I 
wish  to  say  that  whenever  personal  liberty  inter- 
feres with  the  community's  interest,  personal  liberty 
must  be  set  aside,  it  must  take  a  back  seat  in  all 
civilized  countries.  We  cannot  retain  our  personal 
liberty  and  join  any  combination,  any  order,  any 
association  for  the  mutual  good.  To  retain  absolute 
personal  liberty  means  that  we  must  go  back  to 
where  each  tub  stands  on  its  own  bottom. 

"Now,  I  feel  very  keenly  the  opposition  of  the 
miners  to  this  court  of  last  resort^  I  feel  that  the 
miners'  organization,  especially  in  Illinois,  should 
welcome  a  court  of  last  resort-.  As  to  the  particular 
form,  I  do  ndt  care  about  that.  The  average  oper- 
ator does  not  care  whether  you  adopt  the  form 
proposed  or  whether  you  adopt  some  other  method. 
What  we  do  insist  upon,  what  all  the  operators  of 
the  State  of  Illinois,  as  represented  by  the  three 
associations,  insist  upon,  is  that  any  dispute  growing 
out  of  this  agreement,  that  the  joint  boards  cannot 
settle,  must  be  submitted  to  a  court  of  last  resort 
or  some  other  method  to  have  it  finally  disposed 
of  without  interfering  with  the  operation  of  the 
mine.  Call  it  compulsory  arbitration,  voluntary  ar- 
bitration, court  of  last  resort,  or  by  its  proper  name, 
common  sense,  we  must  insist  that  we  cannot  put  in 
from  December  to  May,  starting  at  Indianapolis, 
going  to  Philadelphia,  back  to  Chicago,  down  to 
Peoria,  and  wind  up  about  the  first  of  May  with  an 
agreement  under  which  to  operate  our  mine,  then 
go  home  and  have  those  mines  close  down  when- 
ever a  majority  of  your  Board  in  their  infinite  wis- 
dom decide  it  is  to  your  advantage  to  close  them 
down. 

21 


"Our  mines  are  closed  down  now  and  so  far  as  I 
am  concerned,  and  I  think  I  can  speak  for  every 
operator  in  the  three  associations,  they  may  remain 
closed  and  those  that  are  now  operated  be  closed 
with  them  and  remain  closed,  before  we  will  sign  or 
accept  an  agreement  that  gives  you  the  power,  that 
gives  your  officers  the  temptation  to  cancel  an  ex- 
isting contract  on  us  individually  at  their  pleasure. 
Your  organization  and  the  joint  movement  was  not 
built  up,  gentlemen,  on  that  basis.  You  gave  up 
your  individual  liberty  when  you  took  the  oath  of 
allegiance  to  the  United  Mine  Workers.  I  know,  I 
took  it  myself,  I  administered  it  to  thousands — and 
they  were  mighty  glad  to  give  up  that  individual 
liberty.  That  individual  liberty  didn't  amount  to 
a  row  of  beans  when  you  were  dealing  on  your  in- 
dividual liberty.  You  didn't  quarrel  about  horse- 
backs, you  didn't  quarrel  about  anything,  you  took 
what  the  boss  gave  you — and  if  you  said  much 
about  it  you  moved.  You  know  it,  I  know  it,  every- 
body knows  it.  You  wouldn't  trade  your  present 
condition  for  your  old  individual  liberty  in  Illinois 
if  they  gave  you  a  million  dollars  to  boot — you 
couldn't  afford  it. 

"You  must  recognize,  gentlemen,  that  the  oper- 
ators of  Illinois  and  of  the  Central  West,  including 
the  Southwest,  recognize  your  organization,  entered 
into  these  joint  agreements  with  you  on  the  plea  that 
it  would  do  away  with  strikes  and  lockouts.  We 
said  to  the  miners,  'Come  in,  give  up  your  individ- 
ual liberty,  you  are  not  in  the  position  to  bargain 
to  advantage;  come  together  and  then  we  can  con- 
tract on  some  kind  of  an  equal  basis.  As  individ- 
uals, we  cannot  get  anything  we  are  entitled  to,  we 
must  take  what  is  offered.' 

"Then  we  said  to  the  operators,  'Here,  instead  of 
having  a  strike  called  when  there  are  a  few  agi- 
tators in  your  mines,  instead  of  having  to  raise  the 
price  of  coal  when  the  weather  gets  cold  and  the 
miners  get  haughty,  you  can  make  a  contract  until 
Spring.  Instead  of  raising  the  price  occasionally 
during  the  life  of  a  contract,  come  in  and  make  a 
joint  contract  that  will  guarantee  that  the  mines 
will  operate  uninterruptedly  during  the  life  of  that 
contract.'  They  did  it,  I  did  it,  they  took  the  bait 
and  swallowed  it. 

"And  today  you  tell  us  you  cannot  give  us  a 
court  of  last  resort  because  you  are  surrendering 
your  individual  liberty!  I  want  to  say  to  you  gen- 
tlemen, that  your  brothers  in  half  of  the  mines  of 
this  country  would  be  mighty  glad  to  accept  an 
agreement  anywhere  near  like  that  offered  you  to- 
day and  surrender  their  so-called  individual  liberty. 
Whenever  two  men  enter  into  a  contract  they  sur- 
render their  individual  liberty.  Every  other  agree- 
ment made  in  this  country  provides  some  method  of 

22 


settling  disputes  without  resorting  to  the  shot  gun 
method.  If  we  buy  the  coal  from  a  farmer  on  the 
per  ton  or  royalty  basis  we  have  a  provision  for 
arbitration,  either  by  selecting  a  board  when  the 
dispute  occurs  or  going  into  the  civil  courts.  If 
you  rent  a  house  from  me  or  I  rent  a  piece  of  land 
from  you,  we  have  a  contract  covering  it,  we  have 
an  arbitration  board  to  settle  any  dispute  that  arises 
between  us.  And  yet  you  ask  us,  representing  mil- 
lions and  millions  of  dollars  invested  in  the  Illinois 
coal  mines,  and  you  representing  all  the  brains  and 
muscle  of  seventy  or  eighty  thousand  men,  to  enter 
into  a  contract  with  no  arbitration  and  you  will 
interpret  that  contract. 

"Did  you  ever  stop  to  analyze  what  it  means? 
Do  you  know  that  independent  action  was  served 
on  me,  affecting  a  three  million  dollar  corporation 
and  two  thousand  United  Mine  Workers,  when  there 
was  involved  in  that  dispute  $4.98?  And  when  the 
bill  was  paid  it  amounted  to  $2.49.  That  happened 
during  the  last  three  years.  Do  you  know  that,  no 
matter  how  hard  an  operator  or  how  hard  his 
miners  may  try  to  live  up  to  the  terms  of  the  agree- 
ment, there  is  always  room,  there  is  always  danger 
of  an  honest  dispute  arising  between  them?  If 
so,  if  a  dispute  arises,  shouldn't  it  be  settled?  Isn't 
it  cheaper,  after  your  local  committee  and  the  mine 
manager  disagree,  after  your  sub-district  president 
and  the  superintendent  of  the  company  disagree, 
after  the  commissioner  and  your  state  officer  dis- 
agree, after  your  joint  boards  disagree — isn't  it 
better,  isn't  it  cheaper  to  submit  it  to  an  arbitrator 
than  to  fight  it  out? 

"Look  over  the  records  and  find  how  much  you 
have  gained  by  independent  action  in  District  12, 
then  figure  up  what  it  costs,  and  every  miner  in 
Illinois  will  be  in  favor  of  the  court  of  last  resort. 
And  we  are  entitled  to  it.  You  cannot  eat  your 
apple  and  keep  it.  You  cannot  have  a  contract 
that  guarantees  you  no  disputes  during  the  next  two 
years,  and  gives  you  the  right  to  have  a  dispute 
whenever  you  see  fit.  Your  organization  cannot 
afford  to  play  with  this  dangerous  fire.  What  does 
it  mean?  It  means  that  your  officers  will  be  sub- 
jected day  after  day  to  demands  from  localities, 
from  local  unions,  from  aspiring  officials,  to  declare 
independent  action.  And  so  long  as  you  have  good, 
honest,  level-headed  men  on  your  board  we  may 
not  lose  our  properties;  but  all  you  need  to  do  to 
make  our  properties  worthless  is  to  put  a  majority 
of  men  on  your  board  «that  are  either  corrupt,  or 
weak-kneed,  or  dishonest  enough  to  bury  their  con- 
science when  they  are  deciding  questions,  or  where 
votes  will  depend  at  the  next  election.  Should  men 
recently  from  the  picks  be  subjected  to  this  tempta- 
tion, saying  nothing  of  our  properties  and  our  jobs? 

23 


"I  want  to  say  to  you,  gentlemen,  that  you  must 
not  be  beclouded  or  befogged  by  this  issue  of  a 
court  of  last  resort.  We  have  not  proposed  that 
you  submit  to  compulsory  arbitration,  that  you  give 
up  your  inalienable  right  to  strike — not  at  all,  not 
at  all.  You  are  representing  the  miners  of  Illinois 
and  we  the  mine  owners;  we  are  making  conditions 
under  which  these  properties  are  to  operate  during 
the  coming  two  years,  and  if  there  is  any  one  who 
would  prefer  to  retain  his  independence,  to  retain 
his  individual  liberty,  let  him  go  to  Kentucky,  let 
him  go  to  Colorado,  let  him  go  to  Central  Pennsyl- 
vania or  to  West  Virginia.  If  he  would  rather  have 
that  right  to  strike  when  he  has  a  dispute  with  the 
pit  boss,  let  him  go  where  those  conditions  pre- 
vail." 


On  May  8th,  1914,  the  conference  accepted  a  re- 
port from  its  sub-committee  defining  an  agreed  basis 
for  another  arbitration  arrangement,  which  was 
subsequently  reflected  in  the  new  wage  agreement. 

In  1915,  under  the  present  existing  arbitration 
arrangement  a  number  of  general  questions  were 
decided  by  these  independent  members.  There  is 
now  being  referred  to  the  commission  an  average  of 
something  over  twenty  cases  each  year. 

Many  of  the  miners,  however,  continue  to  be  so 
much  opposed  to  the  work  of  the  commission  that 
they  openly  favor  the  abandonment  of  this  pro- 
cedure. 

While,  as  the  records  show,  independent  action 
has  by  no  means  been  done  away  with  but  to  the 
contrary  seems  at  times  to  be  even  worse  than  ever 
before, — due  allowance  must  be  made  for  the  al- 
most universally  prevailing  disturbance  of  labor 
status  during  the  war  period.  Reasonable  patience 
must  of  necessity  be  exercised  by  operators  and 
miners  alike  in  seeking  intelligent  adjustment  to  the 
new  conditions  that  shall  hereafter  govern  in  the 
industry  both  as  to  wage  level  and  also  the  manner 
in  which  wage  agreements  shall  bt  negotiated  and 
subsequent  disputes  arising  thereunder  settled.  It 
is  a  fair  statement  to  say,  that  the  conservative 
thought  of  both  operators  and  miners  favor  the 
elimination  of  strikes  and  believes  that  few,  in  fact 
almost  no  situation  ever  arises  that  may  not  be 
most  satisfactorily  handled  by  some  form  of  arbi- 
tration, rather  than  through  a  display  of  force 
which  in  the  ultimate  outcome  gains  no  more  sat- 
isfactory results. 

It  is  also  felt  by  operators  generally  and  by  many 
of  the  conscientious  labor  headers  that  the  prompt- 
est means  of  guaranteeing  the  elimination  of  the 
unwarranted,  unauthorized  industrial  strike  is 
through  the  establishment  by  law  of  the  full  re- 
sponsibility for  any  and  all  loss  and  damage  arising 
from  contract  violation. 

24 


